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Economists are increasingly using experiments to study and measure discrimination
between groups. In a meta-analysis containing 441 results from 77 studies, we ﬁnd groups
signiﬁcantly discriminate against each other in roughly a third of cases. Discrimination
varies depending upon the type of group identity being studied: it is stronger when
identity is artiﬁcially induced in the laboratory than when the subject pool is divided by
ethnicity or nationality, and higher still when participants are split into socially or geo-
graphically distinct groups. In gender discrimination experiments, there is signiﬁcant
favouritism towards the opposite gender. There is evidence for both taste-based and
statistical discrimination; tastes drive the general pattern of discrimination against out-
groups, but statistical beliefs are found to affect discrimination in speciﬁc instances.
Relative to all other decision-making contexts, discrimination is much stronger when
participants are asked to allocate payoffs between passive in-group and out-group
members. Students and non-students appear to discriminate equally. We discuss possi-
ble interpretations and implications of our ﬁndings.
& 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Meta-analysis – a commonplace technique in medical science, psychology and, to a growing extent, economics – holds
advantages over literature review in terms of objectivity and analytical rigour. In recent years, the experimental economics
literature appears to have reached a critical mass at which researchers are ﬁnding meta-analyses useful.1 The beneﬁt of
these works is that, by aggregating data across a large number of experiments and exploiting natural between-study design
variation, they pinpoint behavioural regularities and the variables that modify them more precisely than could be done
through qualitative review.
We run a meta-analysis on the body of studies investigating discrimination in lab and lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiments, a
sub-literature which has certainly reached the necessary critical mass for such a venture. Economists' interest in dis-
crimination has been strong ever since Becker (2010), and with the growth of experimental economics in the last two
decades, experiments have emerged as a popular complement to survey-based econometric studies.r B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
nts have been released in recent years, including: Engel (2007) – oligopoly experiments; Prante et al.
cooperation in prisoners’ dilemmas; Hopfensitz (2009) – the effects of reference dependence and the
mp (2009) – time discounting; Weizsäcker (2010) – social learning; Engel (2011) – dictator games;
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than the analysis of naturally-occurring data, avoiding such problems as omitted variable bias and reverse causality. Fur-
thermore, by testing for a very fundamental and general form of discrimination – simply, whether subjects treat others
differently depending on which group those others belong to – experimental economists can produce ﬁndings of interest
not only to their own discipline but also across the social sciences. Also, through the use of incentives, experiments hold a
key advantage over questionnaire-based measures of discrimination, in that they elicit revealed rather than reported
discrimination.
Psychologists had already been studying discrimination in the lab for decades, and experimental economists have drawn
on their knowledge, particularly regarding the minimal group paradigm. This technique was ﬁrst introduced by Tajfel et al.
(1971) and has spawned a huge body of experiments wherein group identity is artiﬁcially induced in the laboratory. This is
often done by, in a preliminary phase of an experiment, asking subjects to state their preference for one artist over another,
or to randomly draw a colour. The experimenter then splits the subject pool into groups according to their art preference, or
the colour they have drawn, and makes it known to participants that the division is based on these differences. Subsequent
stages of such experiments involve interaction tasks between the groups and ﬁnd discrimination surprisingly (at least to the
early researchers) often.
To study discrimination, experimental economists set up games such as the dictator game, the trust game or the pris-
oner’s dilemma, and invite a subject pool segregated along the lines of a particular identity-based characteristic (or else
generate this segregation with artiﬁcial groups). They make subjects aware of the group afﬁliation of those they interact
with, and then measure how their behaviour varies according to whether individuals they are interacting with share their
identity (are in-group) or do not (are out-group).
The number of economics experiments of this type has grown rapidly since the turn of the century and now encom-
passes substantial diversity across several dimensions. Even after omitting many papers which investigate discrimination
but do not meet our inclusion criteria devised to ensure a consistent approach (see Section 2), we are left with a dataset
consisting of 441 experimental results (signiﬁcant and null) from 77 studies – more data than most of the other experi-
mental economics meta-analyses have had. In order to aid the progression of this literature, it is worth taking stock of what
has been found to date, particularly as casual inspection reveals non-uniformity in the results; the strength of discrimination
found against out-groups varies considerably, and some experiments even ﬁnd discrimination in the opposite direction, i.e.
against the in-group.
The aim of this meta-analysis is both to yield broad insights on discrimination and to inform the designers of future
experiments testing for it. We ﬁrst investigate the average strength of discrimination across the literature. We then inquire
how it tends to vary according to speciﬁc experimental characteristics.
In particular, we are interested in whether the strength of discrimination depends on the type of identity being inves-
tigated. Comparing the level of discrimination between artiﬁcial (i.e. minimal) groups and various types of natural groups
(such as those based on ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender and social/geographical afﬁliation) is particularly interesting.
One might expect ‘minimal’ groups to yield minimal levels of discrimination. However, it is also conceivable that artiﬁcial
identity inducement confers an experimenter demand effect in favour of discrimination, or that the experimental priming of
sensitive natural identities reduces subjects’ desire to discriminate owing to a preference not to engage in socially unac-
ceptable behaviour. Evidence for these possibilities, in the form of relatively strong discrimination in artiﬁcial group
experiments, could have implications for the external validity of certain experiments.
A further interesting question is whether the strength of discrimination varies according to the type of decision subjects
are asked to make. This has implications in terms of the real-world circumstances in which discrimination can be most
expected to appear and for the generalisability of ﬁndings.
We further ask whether experiments with students reveal greater or lesser discrimination than those with non-students.
This is also important for the external validity of ﬁndings, and is a question worth pursuing as some studies (e.g. Bellemare
and Kröger, 2007; Anderson et al., 2013) have found students are not entirely representative of wider populations in
economics experiments.
This meta-analysis also aims to shed light on the motivations behind discrimination. Some experiments have been
designed speciﬁcally to distinguish between taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination – the two models that
continue to dominate the theoretical literature in economics. The taste-based model, proposed by Becker (2010), entails
individuals gaining direct utility from the act of discriminating against out-groups. Meanwhile, according to theories of
statistical discrimination – beginning with Arrow (1972) – individuals aim to maximise their own payoffs given their beliefs
and expectations about others' characteristics and behaviour, and discrimination occurs when those beliefs and expecta-
tions vary depending on the group to which the others belong. Understanding the relative importance of these two
motivations will improve the focus of future research and the design of policies aimed at combating discrimination.
Finally, we include a subsection on experiments investigating gender discrimination. Gender is unique amongst the
identity types in having the same two groups in each experiment. It is therefore simple to make a clean comparison
between male-to-female discrimination and female-to-male discrimination.
In summary, the meta-analysis presented below aims to address the following questions: (1) What is the general pattern
of discrimination across the literature? (2) How does the level of discrimination vary according to the type of identity groups
are based upon? (3) How does the level of discrimination depend upon the decision-making context? (4) Do students
discriminate any more or less than non-students? (5) Does the experimental literature provide more support for taste-based
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female-to-male discrimination?
Our main results, presented in Section 3, are as follows. (1) We ﬁnd a moderate tendency towards discrimination against
the out-group, with a majority of null results across the literature. (2) The strength of discrimination against the out-group
does vary according to the type of group identity subjects are divided by. It is greater when identity is artiﬁcially instilled in
a subject pool than when it is divided by nationality or ethnicity – minimal groups, it seems, are not so minimal after all.
Discrimination is even stronger, though, when participants are divided into socially or geographically distinct groups.
(3) The extent of discrimination against the out-group also depends on the role participants are given in an experiment:
when subjects are asked to allocate payoffs between inactive players belonging to the in-group and out-group, it is stronger
than in any other decision-making context. (4) Students do not appear to be differently inclined towards discrimination than
non-students. (5) We ﬁnd evidence in support of both taste-based and statistical discrimination. Tastes appear to drive the
general tendency for discrimination against the out-group, but individual studies have found beliefs to affect discrimination.
(6) In gender discrimination experiments the tendency for discrimination against the out-group is reversed, as subjects
demonstrate slight but signiﬁcant favouritism towards the opposite gender. Discriminatory behaviour in these experiments
does not differ signiﬁcantly between males and females. We discuss possible interpretations of these results in depth in
Section 4.
We are aware of only one other meta-study attempting to analyse the experimental discrimination literature – Balliet
et al. (2014),2 who take 214 estimates of discrimination from 78 studies. There is little overlap between our samples; Balliet
et al. take studies from across the social sciences but their search and inclusion criteria result in most of the experimental
economics literature on discrimination not being included (26 of our studies – around a third – feature in Balliet et al.'s
sample). They exclude decision-making contexts which we consider, such as being the second mover in a sequential game or
a third-party allocator. They also exclude interactions between gender groups.
The present study and that of Balliet et al. can be viewed as complements. Through focusing only on economic
experiments, we enhance comparability and eliminate some studies using methodological elements that may not be
acceptable to some social scientists. Our focus on the economic theories of taste-based and statistical discrimination dif-
ferentiates our study from Balliet et al., who investigate psychological theories of discrimination. Throughout our analysis
we compare our results to theirs. Their paper ﬁnds a similar overall tendency for discrimination to what we do. They ﬁnd
the extent of discrimination not to differ signiﬁcantly between settings of natural and artiﬁcial identity, but do not split
natural identity into subcategories as we do. The clearest difference in results between the two studies is that Balliet et al.
ﬁnd discrimination is stronger by decision-makers who move simultaneously than by ﬁrst movers in sequential exchanges,
while we do not ﬁnd it signiﬁcantly differs between these settings.2. Methodology and criteria for inclusion
We chose to restrict our study to the experimental economics literature. Almost all of the economics experiments have
been conducted in the last 15 years and can reasonably be expected to have followed comparable procedures, which is
important in a meta-analysis. We deﬁne an economics paper as follows: it must either have been published in an economics
journal or have as at least one of its authors a person trained in economics or a business-related discipline, or who has at
least once held a position in an economics or business-related department. Furthermore, we exclude economics papers
which, it is clear to the reader, exhibit a breach of standard experimental economics practice – most notably, deception. For
inclusion, an experiment must involve interaction between individuals whose decisions determine real material payoffs for
participating players. In other words, it must be incentivised.
A serious pitfall meta-analyses can face is publication bias, also named the ‘ﬁle drawer problem’. Because null results are
less likely to be published than signiﬁcant ones, a meta-analysis risks including a disproportionately low number of studies
ﬁnding small or no effects (Rosenthal, 1979; Rothstein et al. 2006). This can lead to an overestimation of average effect sizes.
It can also, if null results are particularly unlikely to be published when combined with certain other features of a study,
result in the meta-analysis overestimating the relationship between strong effects and these features; in our case, for
instance, if null results in trust games were never published but null results in other games sometimes were, we would be in
danger of estimating a spuriously strong relationship between trust games and signiﬁcant results. To minimise such bias, a
good meta-analysis should conduct the most thorough literature search possible in order to ﬁnd all applicable studies,2 Although nothing approaching a full meta-analysis of the in-group-out-group literature had previously been conducted, several social psychology
meta-studies have investigated speciﬁc phenomena within it. Saucier et al. (2005) analysed research measuring the degrees to which subjects would help
white and black people; while not ﬁnding statistically signiﬁcant aggregate discrimination against black people, they showed it increased in emergency
situations and cases where helping was more difﬁcult or risky. Bettencourt et al. (2001) found high-status groups exhibited more in-group bias than low-
status groups. Fischer (2010) concluded discrimination in minimal group experiments was stronger in countries whose societies are considered more
individualistic. Aberson et al. (2000) found greater in-group bias amongst individuals with higher self-esteem. Robbins and Krueger (2005) found social
projection, ‘the tendency to expect similarities between oneself and others’, to be stronger towards in-groups than out-groups, and that this effect was
ampliﬁed with artiﬁcial groups relative to natural ones. Although interesting, many of the studies included in these meta-analyses are considerably
different from those we consider – often they do not relate speciﬁcally to economic behaviour, and even if they do they may not be incentivised.
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‘Discrimination experiment’, ‘Identity experiment’, ‘Ingroup experiment’ and ‘Outgroup experiment’, and carefully sifted
through the output for candidate studies. We then followed the references and citations of all papers identiﬁed as relevant.
Finally, we checked our list of included studies against that of Balliet et al. (2014); this step added one study (Spiegelman,
2012).3 One feature of the literature we meta-analyse is that studies tend to include various different treatments, and
therefore report multiple results. This may act as a further curb on publication bias – insigniﬁcant ﬁndings make their way
into papers alongside more interesting signiﬁcant results (indeed, it turns out the majority of results in our dataset are
null).4
Previous meta-analyses in experimental economics such as Engel (2011) and Johnson and Mislin (2011), which focus on a
single game type, are able to use the average behaviour of subjects (amount sent in the dictator or trust game) as a con-
tinuous dependent variable, with one observation and an associated standard error for each treatment. In our case, we are
pooling across different game types and therefore need a way of transforming the data to make meaningful comparisons
between these settings. Our variable of interest is the difference between decision-makers' behaviour towards their in-
group and their out-group, whilst all other aspects of the experimental design are held constant – in essence, the dis-
crimination effect size. There is typically one observation per every two treatments (one in-group and one out-group
treatment) for each type of player active in the given game. The exception is when a decision-maker interacts with both the
in-group and the out-group in the same treatment (either by making one decision which simultaneously affects both, or by
playing in the same role twice), in which case a within-treatment measure of discrimination is available.5 The ideal
approach would be to record an effect size for each comparison, and we attempt to do this. Consistent with Balliet et al.
(2014), the measure we use is Hedges' unbiased d: the mean difference in behaviour towards the in-group and the out-
group, divided by the pooled standard deviation, with a minor correction for sample size (Hedges and Olkin, 1985).
However, a substantial number of studies do not report sufﬁcient data for us to calculate effect sizes. This is particularly
the case with null results, as when a difference is not signiﬁcant authors are less likely to report the test statistic fromwhich
an effect size could be derived. We sent data requests to the authors of all papers for which we could not construct the
measure using information provided in the paper. After receiving data from 22 of the 36 sets of contacted authors, we ended
up with effect sizes on 364 of our 441 data-points. We therefore also employ a binary dependent variable, recording simply
whether, for each comparison, behaviour signiﬁcantly favours the in-group over the out-group at the 5% level.6 The effect
size is the inferior dependent variable in that it restricts the sample and may lead to greater under-representation of null
results; but the superior one in terms of information content.
For simplicity, we deﬁne ‘discrimination’ as discrimination against the out-group, and ‘out-group favouritism’ as dis-
crimination against the in-group, and will use these terms hereafter. Unlike some, we make no distinction between
nepotism and discrimination; any result of favouritism towards one group relative to a second can equivalently be inter-
preted as discrimination against the second group. We therefore conceptualise ‘discrimination’ (against the out-group) as
something which can be measured on a continuumwith positive and negative values. When discussing average effect sizes,
we will describe a relatively low value as indicating ‘lower’ or ‘weaker’ discrimination, even if it is driven by highly negative
effect sizes (i.e. even if it is driven by instances of strong discrimination against the in-group).
For an observation to meet our inclusion criteria, there must be an in-group and out-group, clearly deﬁned on the basis of
categorisation by a discrete identity-relevant variable, such as ethnicity, gender or – as with artiﬁcial groups – the pre-
ference for a particular artist or the colour randomly drawn. There must be controlled interaction within and between the
groups, and decision-makers must be aware that they are interacting with individuals belonging to their in-group or out-
group. We only consider an in-group to be appropriately deﬁned as such if every one of its members shares the same
categorisation as the decision-maker on the basis of the relevant variable. For an out-group to be appropriately so-deﬁned,
every member must take a different categorisation from the decision-maker. It is not required that all members of an out-
group take the same categorisation as each other. For instance, Guillen and Ji (2011) use as their two groups Australian and
non-Australian. In this case, for an Australian decision-maker the Australians are the in-group and the non-Australians the
out-group, but for a non-Australian the other non-Australians should not count as their in-group. We then only record the
observed behaviour of the appropriately deﬁned group, the Australians in this example. Occasionally, we are forced to make
a subjective decision on what can reasonably be considered a group. For example, from Chen et al. (2011), which splits its
US-based sample into white and Asian students, we record the behaviour of the white ‘group’ but not that of the Asians, as
we believe that in American society white people can appropriately be deﬁned as comprising a shared ethnicity, whilst3 The Balliet et al. project was not in the public domain when we embarked upon ours, and we were unaware of it. We designed our search and
inclusion criteria independently of theirs. However, learning of their meta-analysis provided the perfect opportunity to test the thoroughness of our search
for studies. That Balliet et al. include only one study which ﬁts our inclusion criteria but which we had not independently found suggests it is unlikely we
have missed many applicable papers.
4 The number of observations generated by a single paper varies from 1 to 24, with Chen et al. (2014) providing the most.
5 For a game to meaningfully measure discrimination, and therefore for us to include it, it must be possible to unambiguously rank the decision-
maker's available actions in terms of how favourable they are to the decision-maker's partner. Certain coordination games cannot be included, since
whether one action is more favourable depends upon the move a partner simultaneously makes. In Appendix A, Table A.2 we list all the game types
included in our sample, and explain how they measure discrimination.
6 We also do this for out-group favouritism, recording whether or not behaviour signiﬁcantly favours the out-group over the in-group at the 5% level,
and run separate regressions on this. These are reported in Appendix C, Table C.1.
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groups but measure each subject’s position on a scale of social distance, based on a continuous variable, are not included.
If an experimental design splits the sample up into more than two separate groups, on the basis of a single identity-
relevant variable, we record separately how each group treats each other group relative to its own. If such a paper reports
that Group A does not signiﬁcantly discriminate against Group B or Group C but does signiﬁcantly discriminate against
Groups B and C combined, we record two results of no discrimination rather than one result of discrimination; and in the
main text of this paper we report our results using this approach. We do this because, although Groups B and C combined
could represent a single out-group as deﬁned above, the experiment was set up to treat them as separate out-groups.
Similarly, we do not include the reported results of statistical tests run on data pooling two or more treatment pairs. These
are grey areas but we have re-run our main regression results for the binary dependent variables in the case of treating
every result reported in our sample as an observation: this adds 16 extra data-points and does not qualitatively change our
ﬁndings.
Sufﬁcient data must be reported for it to be clear whether there is signiﬁcant discrimination in each pair of treatments
(or, when applicable, single treatment); if we cannot work out whether there is discrimination in one or more treatment
pair, the whole paper is omitted from the study. This is because papers are less likely to report the results of statistical tests
ﬁnding no discrimination, and if we failed to include a given study’s non-results our analysis would overestimate the
likelihood of this particular design ﬁnding discrimination. For similar reasons, if an experiment employs a cross-cutting
design, dividing its subject pool by multiple identity types, it must report whether there is discrimination on the basis of
each category. For example, an experiment which segregates the subjects by both gender and ethnicity must report, for each
applicable treatment pair, whether each ethnic group discriminates against each other ethnic group or not, and also
whether each gender discriminates against the other or not. Otherwise, we omit the study.
Experimenters using artiﬁcial groups generally conduct tests on pooled data; rather than reporting whether Group A
discriminates against Group B and vice versa, they report whether individuals across the sample pool discriminate against
out-group members. This makes sense because there is no obvious reason to doubt the relationship between two artiﬁcial
groups is completely symmetrical. As such, we use pooled discrimination observations for artiﬁcial group experiments.
Using similar reasoning, we also admit pooled discrimination observations for experiments dividing subjects by their real-
world social groups. The pooling of certain types of data might lead to an increased chance of ﬁnding discrimination in
certain experiments, which is one reason why we use the size of the sample from which the result is derived as a control
variable in our regression analysis.
We limit our analysis to lab and lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiments; we do not include pure ﬁeld experiments, in which
subjects do not know they are participants in a study. We therefore do not include the large body of ﬁeld experiments in
which applications are sent to employers, landlords or others to test for discrimination in markets (correspondence studies).
2.1. Analytical methods
Listed in the next subsection are descriptions of the independent variables we include in our regressions. Our basic
model contains role and identity type dummies, and some controls. Because our samples are not large and most variables
are dummies, we regard linear probability models (LPMs) with errors corrected for heteroskedasticity as the best speciﬁ-
cations when employing the binary dependent variables. However, we also run as robustness checks logit models, which we
report in Appendix C, Table C.2. In some cases the logits drop observations, which is a major disadvantage. Their results,
however, are qualitatively similar to the LPMs. When using binary dependent variables, we treat each study within the
meta-analysis as providing a cluster of observations.
When analysing the continuous dependent variable, we ﬁrst use standard random effects meta-analysis procedures to
determine average effect sizes for our full sample and for the subsamples based on identity type. These are simply aggregate
estimates for the level of discrimination in the relevant subsample; they do not control for independent variables. The
procedure takes into account that each observation has an associated standard error. It weights each observation by the
inverse of this standard error, thus attaching more importance to results from larger samples and with smaller standard
deviations. It then follows an unweighting process, the extent of which depends upon the heterogeneity in effect sizes. The
more heterogeneity there is across effect sizes, the more equal will be the weights attached to observations with small or
large standard errors (Harbord and Higgins., 2008).8
We then apply random effects meta-regressions, which allow the inclusion of independent variables in the analysis.
These models follow the same processes of weighting and unweighting observations as described in the previous paragraph,
but are otherwise standard linear regressions. Whereas with the binary dependent variable we must approach dis-
crimination and out-group favouritism separately, the meta-regression analyses both simultaneously, since the effect sizes
can be positive or negative. This can be one reason why the results of the meta-regressions may differ from those of the7 There were four cases where we made such subjective decisions, all listed in Appendix A. Our main results still hold regardless of the decisions we
come to in these cases.
8 The random effects approach is more suitable for our purposes than the ﬁxed effects alternative, which excludes the unweighting step; the ﬁxed
effects process assumes there to be one true effect size across all studies, while random effects allow it to vary – the latter seems more plausible in our case,
as we do not assume discrimination to be a universal constant.
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do not match those of the LPM regressions on discrimination, we present the LPMs re-run on the reduced effect-size sample,
in order to determine whether the disparity is due to the change in sample or the change in analytical approach.
2.2. Independent variables
2.2.1. Role type dummies
We include role type dummy variables to pursue the question of how different decision-making contexts affect the
extent of discrimination. The games used in this literature feature either multilateral or unilateral decision-making. When
decision-making is multilateral, the outcome of the game is determined by more than one player's actions. From such
situations, we identify three different role types: First Mover (140 observations), where one's move does not ﬁnish the game;
Second Mover (119 observations), where one determines the ﬁnal payoffs in response to the co-player(s)’ actions; and
Simultaneous Mover (66 observations), where one makes the last move of the game at the same time as one's co-player(s).
When decision-making is unilateral, the ﬁnal outcome of the game is determined by one player. From these situations,
we identify a further three role types. First, there is the Dictator (67 observations), who allocates payoffs between another
player and his- or herself. Next we have third-party allocators (Allocator, 30). These are players who must divide a pie
between two or more passive players (who, in these experiments, are members of different groups), but whose own payoff
does not depend on this decision. Finally, there are players tasked with selecting a partner (from a choice of in-group and
out-group participants) with whom to play a subsequent game. We label this role Partner Chooser (19 observations).92.2.2. Identity type dummies
A second set of dummy variables records which type of group identity a given experimental sample has been divided
according to. We consider identity to have been artiﬁcially induced if researchers split subjects into groups that, prior to the
experiment, did not exist – in the sense of group members sharing characteristics that are not also shared by members of
other groups in the study – and the subjects are aware they have been split into these groups.10 49 studies in the meta-
analysis investigate natural identity, 32 artiﬁcially generate it, while the remaining four contain both natural and artiﬁcial
treatments. We have 272 observations for natural identity types and 169 for artiﬁcial. We subdivide the natural observations
into six speciﬁc categories of natural identity.
First, we have 82 observations from 13 studies in which subjects are divided by Nationality. Next, nine studies investigate
Ethnicity-based identity, adding 63 observations. A further seven studies generate 32 observations on Gender identity. 21
more observations are provided by ﬁve studies in which the subjects are split by Religion. 13 studies use a rather different
approach, dividing the subject pool into groups based on real-world social and/or geographical identity. This is done in a
variety of ways: for instance, using villages (Dugar and Shahriar, 2010), colleges within universities (Banuri et al., 2012) or
friendship groups (Brandts and Sola, 2010). However, all such designs share the common feature that each decision-maker
has a clearly distinct social and/or geographical in-group – group identity here is deﬁned with reference to the relative
frequency with which one interacts with in- and out-group members in ordinary life. The 57 observations generated by
these experiments are coded under the variable Soc/Geo Groupings. The remaining 17 results, from four papers, deal with
other types of natural identity, which cannot appropriately be ﬁtted into the above categories. These observations relate to
political identity (Abbink and Harris, 2012), disability (Gneezy et al., 2012), caste (Hoff et al., 2011) and whether farmers are
private or members of cooperatives (Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa, 2013). We pool them under the composite variable
Natural Other. 11,122.2.3. Other variables
In our regressions we include as a dummy variable (Students) whether each observation derives from a sample consisting
predominantly of students or non-students. Even if not explicitly stated, we assume experiments run at universities have at
most a very small number of non-student participants. Likewise, while we accept experiments in the ﬁeld may include a few
student subjects, their proportion is likely to be low (unless otherwise stated). As another control, we include the size of the
active decision-making sample from which a given result is derived (Sample Size).9 We ran further regressions in which we categorised the role types differently. In these models, dummy variables were assigned to speciﬁc game
settings, such as the trust game sender and the trust game returner. The results are reported in Appendix B.
10 There is some inconsistency in the literature on the deﬁnition of 'minimal groups'; some authors (e.g. Chen and Chen, 2011) categorise certain
artiﬁcial groups as ‘near minimal’. For our purposes, we use ‘minimal groups’ synonymously with 'artiﬁcially created groups.' In Appendix B, we explore the
effects of inducing artiﬁcial identity using different methods, and show that it seems not to matter precisely how ‘minimal’ the groups are.
11 The distinction between Soc/Geo Groupings and Natural Other is not arbitrary: in- and out-groups in the Natural Other category are not necessarily
socially or geographically distinct. However, if the Natural Other observations are incorporated into the Soc/Geo Groupings category, the Soc/Geo Groupings
coefﬁcients do not change substantially and all other results discussed in the paper remain unaffected.
12 Two papers provide separate results on more than one natural identity category.
Fig. 1. reakdown of data-points by result type. Note: Blue bars show the percentage of observations in our dataset which ﬁnd signiﬁcant discrimination (at
the 5% level), a null result, and signiﬁcant out-group favouritism (at the 5% level). Red points show the average effect sizes for observations belonging to
each category. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
Breakdown of data-points by result type and identity type.
Category Obs. Find discrimi-
nation (%)
Find null
(%)
Find out-
group
favouritism
(%)
Obs. with available effect
sizes
Average Effect size (d) (with 95% C.I.
below)
Artiﬁcial 169 42.0 55.6 2.4 150 0.365(0.279–0.450)
Natural
National 82 18.3 68.3 13.4 52 0.164 (0.042–0.286)
Ethnic 63 11.1 82.6 6.3 59 0.134 (0.013–0.255)
Gender 32 9.4 65.6 25.0 28 0.177 (0.301 to 0.053)
Religious 21 14.3 80.9 4.8 21 0.034(0.062 to 0.131)
Soc/Geo 57 64.9 35.1 0.0 51 0.551 (0.432–0.669)
Natural Other
Groupings
17 47.1 52.9 0.0 7 0.036(0.158 to 0.086)
Notes: For each identity type: the number of observations in our dataset; the percentage of these observations that ﬁnd signiﬁcant discrimination (at the 5%
level), null results, and signiﬁcant out-group favouritism (at the 5% level); the number of observations for which effect sizes are calculable; and the
weighted average effect size across such observations, with associated 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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3.1. What is the general pattern of discrimination across the literature?
In total, as shown in Fig. 1, there are 144 results indicating signiﬁcant discrimination (32.65%), 28 indicating signiﬁcant
out-group favouritism (6.35%), and 269 indicating no signiﬁcant discrimination or out-group favouritism (61.00%). 57 of our
77 studies record at least one result of discrimination, while only 15 record any results of out-group favouritism. 10 studies
separately record results of discrimination and out-group favouritism. The general tendency, then, leans towards insignif-
icant results, although only 15 studies consist entirely of nulls.
For the sub-sample where we are able to generate effect sizes (364 of 441 observations), the random effects meta-
analysis ﬁnds an overall effect size of 0.256 (95% conﬁdence range: 0.209–0.304). This can be interpreted as, on average,
subjects' discriminating against out-groups by about a quarter of a standard deviation. This is not signiﬁcantly different from
Balliet et al. (2014), who ﬁnd an overall effect size of 0.32 (95% conﬁdence range: 0.27–0.38). Fig. 1 also displays point
estimates for aggregate effect sizes, conditional on the type of result found for each observation. Observations ﬁnding
signiﬁcant discrimination have an average effect size of 0.67, those yielding null results have an average effect size of 0.11,
and those ﬁnding signiﬁcant out-group favouritism have an average effect size of 0.51; this conﬁrms that the strength of
the effect size tends to be closely related to the type of result found for a given observation.
Table 2a
Linear probability regressions on discrimination and meta-regressions on effect size.
Dependent variable Discrimination d
LPMa LPMb Metareg
Identity
Ethnicity 0.293nnn 0.294nnn 0.140n
(0.067) (0.070) (0.079)
Religion 0.235n 0.256n 0.164
(0.131) (0.144) (0.125)
Nationality 0.240nnn 0.163 0.145n
(0.079) (0.099) (0.075)
Gender 0.312nnn 0.335nnn 0.456nnn
(0.068) (0.072) (0.099)
Soc/Geo Groupings 0.252nn 0.229n 0.354nnn
(0.099) (0.122) (0.089)
Natural Other 0.056 0.243 0.236
(0.165) (0.197) (0.192)
Role Types
First Mover 0.033 0.025 0.136n
(0.074) (0.081) (0.079)
Second Mover 0.079 0.066 0.050
(0.065) (0.075) (0.085)
Simultaneous Mover 0.015 0.023 0.095
(0.102) (0.117) (0.095)
Allocator 0.371nnn 0.408nnn 1.077nnn
(0.094) (0.140) (0.155)
Partner Chooser 0.070 0.118 0.110
(0.108) (0.113) (0.127)
Controls
Students 0.005 0.025 0.086
(0.063) (0.076) (0.077)
Sample Size 6.6e4 4.9e4 6.6e4
(4.8e4) (7.2e4) (4.8e4)
Constant 0.406nnn 0.422nnn 0.144n
(0.089) (0.104) (0.105)
R2 (adjusted in Metareg) 0.201 0.196 0.240
N 441 364 364
Notes: LPMa is linear probability model run on full sample, Metareg is meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available, LPMb is linear
probability model run on same sample as Metareg; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Artiﬁcial (identity); errors in LPM models are corrected
for heteroskedasticity, with 77 clusters in LPMa and 67 in LPMb; standard errors in italics.
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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3.2. How does the level of discrimination vary according to the type of identity groups are based upon?
Table 1 displays a breakdown of our sample's observations by identity category, and the results of random effects meta-
analyses run on these sub-samples. For most categories the tendency is towards null results. Only for Soc/Geo Groupings –
which yields no results of out-group favouritism – are observations of discrimination more likely than insigniﬁcant results,
and this is also the identity type with the highest average effect size. The category for which there is least discrimination and
most out-group favouritism is gender; the average effect size for this sub-sample is negative.
Table 2a extends the analysis of Table 1 through the use of regressions. LPMa is a linear probability model with the
dependent variable discrimination against the out-group (equal to 1 if discrimination is found, 0 otherwise). Metareg is a
meta-regression with the dependent variable the discrimination effect size. In both models artiﬁcial identity and the
Table 2b
Linear Restriction Tests on models presented in Table 2a.
Null Hypothesis P value on two-tailed test
LPMa LPMb Metareg
Identity
Ethnicity¼Religion 0.662 0.776 0.848
Ethnicity¼Nationality 0.533 0.201 0.952
Ethnicity¼Gender 0.785 0.556 0.007nnn
Ethnicity¼Soc/Geo Groupings o0.001nnn o0.001nnn o0.001nnn
Ethnicity¼Natural Other 0.144 0.786 0.612
Religion¼Nationality 0.973 0.545 0.889
Religion¼Gender 0.573 0.582 0.059n
Religion¼Soc/Geo Groupings o0.001nnn 0.001nnn o0.001nnn
Religion¼Natural Other 0.365 0.951 0.719
Nationality¼Gender 0.341 0.033nn 0.006nnn
Nationality¼Soc/Geo Groupings o0.001nnn 0.005nnn o0.001nnn
Nationality¼Natural Other 0.294 0.699 0.648
Gender¼Soc/Geo Groupings o0.001nnn o0.001nnn o0.001nnn
Gender¼Natural Other 0.134 0.64 0.297
Soc/Geo Groupings¼Natural Other 0.080n 0.018nn 0.002nnn
Role Types
First Mover¼Second Mover 0.444 0.552 0.175
First Mover¼Simultaneous Mover 0.617 0.639 0.589
First Mover¼Allocator o0.001nnn 0.004nnn o0.001nnn
First Mover¼Partner Chooser 0.309 0.17 0.831
Second Mover¼Simultaneous Mover 0.329 0.399 0.579
Second Mover¼Allocator o0.001nnn 0.001nnn o0.001nnn
Second Mover¼Partner Chooser 0.129 0.082n 0.621
Simultaneous Mover¼Allocator 0.004nnn 0.011nn o0.001nnn
Simultaneous Mover¼Partner Chooser 0.636 0.434 0.902
Allocator¼Partner Chooser 0.021nn 0.064n o0.001nnn
Note: LPMa is linear probability model run on full sample, Metareg is meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available, LPMb is linear
probability model run on same sample as Metareg.
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
T. Lane / European Economic Review 90 (2016) 375–402 383dictator game are the benchmark categories.13 In these regressions we test whether our identity-type variables still yield
signiﬁcantly different levels of discrimination after controlling for other factors. Table 2b presents the results of linear
restriction tests run on the sets of dummy variables featuring in the models.
In both the linear probability models and meta-regression, the identity category linked to the strongest discrimination is
social and geographical groupings. In Metareg it yields signiﬁcantly higher discrimination, at the 1% level, than any of the
other identity categories. In LPMa it does the same, except that the differences with Artiﬁcal and Natural Other are only
signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
The identity category linked to the weakest discrimination is gender. Both the linear probability model and the meta-
regression indicate weaker discrimination between genders than between artiﬁcial groups, signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
meta-regression also ﬁnds gender discrimination to be weaker than ethnic and national discrimination (at the 1% level), and
religious discrimination (at the 10% level). However, LPMa does not ﬁnd these differences to be signiﬁcant.14
In LPMa the coefﬁcients on the ethnic and national identity types are signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, strongly
indicating that discrimination is less likely to be observed when subject pools are split along these lines than on the basis of13 By necessity, the choices of omitted categories are somewhat arbitrary – there are no variables to serve as obvious baselines for comparison. We
selected Artiﬁcial because we regard comparisons between discrimination with artiﬁcial and natural forms of identity to be particularly interesting (as
discussed in Section 1). For role type; we selected Dictator because it is a commonly used game in experimental economics and arguably the simplest,
making it a useful object for comparison.
14 Gender is also found to be signiﬁcant in a linear probability regression with out-group favouritism as the dependent variable, presented as LPMa1 in
Appendix C, Table C.1. Our results show that gender experiments are more likely to yield observations of out-group favouritism than all other identity types
except Nationality, with all differences signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This model additionally ﬁnds experiments with socially or geographically distinct groups
are less likely to provide results of out-group favouritism than those with artiﬁcial or national groups. Other identity types are not associated with
signiﬁcantly strong or weak out-group favouritism – however, we have few results of out-group favouritism across our sample. Where we do ﬁnd sig-
niﬁcant identity type effects on out-group favouritism, they are in directions consistent with the results on discrimination – when an identity type is
positively (negatively) associated with out-group favouritism, it will be negatively (positively) associated with discrimination.
T. Lane / European Economic Review 90 (2016) 375–402384artiﬁcial identities. According to Metareg, however, ethnic and national identity experiments are only linked to signiﬁcantly
lower discrimination (i.e. less positive effect sizes) than artiﬁcial group experiments at the 10% level.
Given the inconsistency, Table 2a also reports LPMb, a linear probability model run on the reduced sample for which
effect size calculation is possible. This helps to distinguish whether the losses of signiﬁcance when moving from LPMa to
Metareg are due to the reduction in sample or the change in measurement technique. For the comparison of national and
artiﬁcial identity, the loss of signiﬁcance appears to be due to the change in sample, as in LPMb the coefﬁcient is also
insigniﬁcant. The same cannot be said for Ethnicity, however, as the linear probability model on the reduced sample con-
tinues to report signiﬁcantly less discrimination between ethnic than artiﬁcial groups at the 1% level. Doubt, therefore, is
cast over the robustness of our ﬁnding on ethnicity – although the coefﬁcient’s sign is at least weakly signiﬁcant.15,16
Result 2. The strength of discrimination depends upon the type of group identity under investigation. It is stronger when
identity is artiﬁcially induced in the laboratory than when the subject pool is divided by ethnicity or nationality, and higher
still when participants are split into socially or geographically distinct groups.
3.3. How does the level of discrimination depend upon the decision-making context?
Inspection of the coefﬁcients on role type dummies in LPMa and Metareg (Table 2a) reveals discrimination is sig-
niﬁcantly stronger when the decision-maker is a third-party allocator than when he or she is a dictator (the omitted
category). Linear restriction tests (Table 2b) also show the third-party allocator role is more likely to be associated with
discrimination than all the other role types, with the difference always signiﬁcant at the 1% level under both models. The
size of the Allocator coefﬁcients in the meta-regression (1.077) is worth noting – it indicates that discrimination in games
of this type tends to be very large indeed, with on average more than one standard deviation between subjects' treatment
of in- and out-groups.
The other role types do not carry signiﬁcantly different effects from one another. This is at odds with Kiyonari and
Yamagishi (2004) and Balliet et al. (2014), who ﬁnd discrimination to be stronger by simultaneous movers than ﬁrst
movers (Balliet et al. do not investigate second movers). In an attempt to discern why our result differs from that of
Balliet et al., we re-ran our analysis keeping only the observations included in their study. We found there was still no
signiﬁcant difference between First Mover and Simultaneous Mover (the remaining sample on which to run this
regression was small; however, we also compared the aggregate effect sizes for each category and found they are very
similar). This suggests the signiﬁcance of the ﬁnding in Balliet et al. is driven by studies outside our dataset, i.e. outside
the economics literature.17
Result 3. Third-party allocators discriminate more than decision-makers in all other roles.
3.4. Do students discriminate any more or less than non-students?
Most decision-makers in our analysis were students. Only 101 observations, from 22 studies, are produced by in-groups
not comprised (at least in their near-entirely) of university students. 31.8% of the observations for students return dis-
crimination, while 6.8% ﬁnd out-group favouritism and 61.5% are null; for non-students 35.6% ﬁnd discrimination, 5.0% yield
out-group favouritism and 59.4% are null. The coefﬁcient on Students is not signiﬁcant in any of our regressions. That
experiments with students do not generate signiﬁcantly different levels of discrimination than those with non-students is
an interesting non-result which suggests that, in this literature, working with student samples will not generate a biased
perception of the extent and magnitude of discrimination by the wider population.18
Result 4. : Discrimination does not signiﬁcantly differ between students and non-students.
3.5. Does the experimental literature provide more support for taste-based or statistical theories of discrimination?
For 262 (59.4%) of our observations, as a result of the experimental design any discrimination must be taste-based, as it
cannot be statistical. Statistical discrimination cannot occur when a player is making the only or last move in a game, unless15 In Table 3, we will later present a meta-regression with the number of role type dummies reduced from ﬁve to one. The purpose of this model is to
investigate taste-based and statistical discrimination. However, it is worth noting that in this model with fewer independent variables, the coefﬁcient on
Ethnicity is found to be signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level. This improves our conﬁdence that there is an effect. The coefﬁcient on Nationality is also
signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) in that model.
16 We are particularly interested in the ﬁnding that discrimination is stronger in artiﬁcial group experiments than those employing certain types of
natural identity. In an attempt to gain a greater understanding of what drives discrimination between artiﬁcial groups, we ran regressions focusing on just
the artiﬁcial identity sample, coding for the method experimenters used to create artiﬁcial groups. We ﬁnd it makes no difference whether groups are
based on preferences (such as for a particular painting) or sheer randomisation. Furthermore, we do not ﬁnd that team-building exercises designed to
strengthen artiﬁcial group identity signiﬁcantly increase the level of discrimination. These results are all presented in greater detail in Appendix B.
17 With out-group favouritism as the dependent variable (LPMa1 in Appendix C, Table C.1), we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences at all between any role
type pair.
18 In Appendix B, we also show that the country where an experiment is run is not a signiﬁcant predictor of the extent of the discrimination found.
Table 3
Linear probability regressions on discrimination and out-group favouritism, and meta-regression on effect size, with or without scope for statistical
discrimination.23
Dependent variable Discrimination D
LPMa Metareg
Type of discrimination possible
TasteþStatistical 0.009 0.071
(0.056) (0.053)
Identity
Ethnicity 0.285nnn 0.189nn
(0.063) (0.080)
Religion 0.279nn 0.232n
(0.134) (0.131)
Nationality 0.237nnn 0.225nnn
(0.072) (0.079)
Gender 0.315nnn 0.545nnn
(0.064) (0.100)
Soc/GeoGroupings 0.238nn 0.265nnn
(0.097) (0.093)
Natural Other 0.074 0.306
(0.266) (0.202)
Controls
Students 0.043 0.116
(0.072) (0.080)
Sample Size 4.5e4 2.7e4
(4.7e3) (4.4e3)
Constant 0.350nnn 0.238nn
(0.089) (0.093)
R2 (adjusted in Metareg) 0.157 0.138 (adjusted)
N 441 364
Notes: LPMa is linear probability model run on full sample, Metareg is meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available; omitted
categories are taste-based only (type of discrimination possible) and Artiﬁcial (identity); errors in LPMa are corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 77
clusters; standard errors in parentheses.
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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returners, for example, can only be taste-based, because opponents then have no control over the ﬁnal outcome and beliefs
about their type are therefore irrelevant.19 All observations under the Dictator and Allocator categories preclude the pos-
sibility of statistical discrimination, as do all except seven (due to the game being repeated) in the Second Mover category. All
observations under the First Mover category permit the possibility of statistical discrimination, as do most in the Partner
Chooser category and around a third in the Simultaneous Mover category.20
In Table 3, we run a linear probability regression on discrimination and a meta-regression on the discrimination effect
size, with role types re-coded into two types: one, TasteþStatistical, where there is scope for both taste-based and statistical
discrimination, the other (the omitted category) where there is scope only for taste-based discrimination. Note that in this
literature any game-role contains scope for taste-based discrimination. The coefﬁcient on TasteþStatistical is positive but
insigniﬁcant in both the linear probability regression (p¼0.87) and the meta-regression (p¼0.18). This indicates there is no
signiﬁcant difference in the likelihood of observing discrimination, or in the predicted effect size, when scope for statistical
discrimination is added.2119 There is a grey area to be acknowledged here. One could have a model of statistical taste-based discrimination, in which people have a taste for
discrimination against a group because of beliefs they hold about its members (for instance, about how rich they are). In this paper, we do not distinguish
between this and any other type of taste-based discrimination (i.e. we do not consider root motivations for taste-based discrimination).
20 In Appendix A, Table A.2, we list which speciﬁc games permit which forms of discrimination.
21 We also ran a linear probability model on out-group favouritism, with the equivalent speciﬁcation to LPMa1 in Table 3. This is reported as LPMa2 in
Appendix C, Table C.1. As with discrimination, there is no signiﬁcant difference in the likelihood of observing out-group favouritism when scope for
statistical discrimination is added.
T. Lane / European Economic Review 90 (2016) 375–402386This would suggest taste-based discrimination is an important driver of behaviour in these experiments and statistical
discrimination is not, but we probe further by analysing the results of individual experiments. Where there is scope for
statistically-motivated discrimination, by design for 66.5% of these observations it is not possible to disentangle its effects
from taste-based motivations. To be able to do so, an experiment must either use belief elicitation or include a control game
in which behaviour can only be taste-based – the most common case of this is adding a dictator game to extricate taste-
based from statistical discrimination by trust game senders.22 In the 60 cases that it is possible to distinguish between
discriminatory motives, the authors ﬁnd signiﬁcant statistical discrimination to occur in 13 cases (10 times against the out-
group and three times in favour of it). Within the same sample, for given beliefs or behaviour in a game with a belief-based
component, they ﬁnd signiﬁcant taste-based deviations from own-payoff-maximisation in 26 cases (16 times against the
out-group and 10 times in favour of it). In 26 cases neither statistical nor taste-based discrimination is found at the 5% level.
We list all signiﬁcant ﬁndings of taste-based and statistical discrimination from experiments designed to distinguish
between the two in Appendix A, Table A.3.
Although the sample is small, tastes are found to affect behaviour more often than statistical beliefs. It seems, however,
that beliefs do play some role in determining discriminatory behaviour in economics experiments. We conjecture that the
insigniﬁcant regression results in Table 3 may be due to the fact that beliefs can either increase or reduce discrimination.
This would be because individuals have favourable beliefs about the cooperativeness of out-groups, or because unfavourable
beliefs about the out-group's cooperativeness can in some cases actually lead to statistical out-group favouritism. That is,
depending on the game setting, self-serving optimal behaviour can either become more or less generous in response to the
perception that one's partner is relatively uncooperative. In ultimatum games, for instance, if proposers expect out-group
responders to treat them less favourably than in-group responders do, the self-serving optimum is to send them relatively
kind offers. This is in contrast to how ﬁrst mover behaviour would work in trust games, say, where a self-serving sender will
send relatively low investments to an out-group responder if it expects to be treated unfavourably by them.24,25
Result 5. : There is evidence for both taste-based and statistical discrimination. Tastes appear to drive the general tendency
for discrimination against the out-group, but individual studies have found beliefs to affect discrimination.
3.6. In gender experiments, how does male-to-female discrimination compare with female-to-male discrimination?
An immediately obvious ﬁnding is that gender acts very differently from other identity types. It is the only identity
category which is more likely to be associated with a bias against the in-group than against the out-group, with eight results
of the former and three of the latter out of a total 32 observations. On the reduced sample, the random effects meta-analysis
ﬁnds an overall discrimination effect size of 0.177 (95% conﬁdence range: 0.301 to 0.053) for gender experiments,
representing signiﬁcant out-group favouritism. There is obvious intuition why gender is different from the other identity
categories: it is the only case in which the effects of sexual attraction – towards the out-group more than the in-group, for
most subjects – and 'chivalry’ (Eckel and Grossman, 2001) can be expected.
Every experiment on gender in the meta-analysis has a symmetrical male-female design, meaning that for every esti-
mate of discrimination by men against women there is an identical treatment measuring discrimination by women against
men. This allows a very clean comparison of these two behaviours across the sample. The only three signiﬁcant results in
our dataset of one gender discriminating against the other are female decision-makers discriminating against males, while
six of the eight signiﬁcant results of one gender favouring the other are male decision-makers favouring females. However,
the calculated overall effect size for female decision-makers is actually slightly more negative than for males: 0.181 (95%
conﬁdence range: 0.35 to 0.013) for females and 0.173 (95% conﬁdence range: 0.369 to 0.024) for males, although
the difference is far from signiﬁcant. Note that while the effect size indicates females signiﬁcantly favour males at the 5%
level, the equivalent effect for male decision-makers is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Result 6. : There is signiﬁcant out-group favouritism in gender experiments. Females signiﬁcantly favour males; males
favour females but the effect is only weakly signiﬁcant.22 There are no precisely standard methods for disentangling taste-based and statistical discrimination. When using a control game in which only
taste-based discrimination is possible, statistical discrimination is identiﬁed if this game ﬁnds signiﬁcantly weaker discrimination than the setting with
scope for both types of discrimination. When using belief elicitation, statistical discrimination is conﬁrmed if beliefs about the in-group and out-group
signiﬁcantly differ, and there is signiﬁcant discrimination in the direction that would maximise the decision-makers' payoffs based on these beliefs; taste-
based discrimination is conﬁrmed if there is still signiﬁcant discrimination after controlling for the beliefs. Some studies use regression analysis, others
non-parametric tests.
23 Table 3 does not present an LPMb model because in this case we are not interested in investigating any disparities between LPMa and Metareg – the
TasteþStatistical coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant in both models.
24 We are unable to explore this empirically. We can separate games into those where favourable beliefs about a partner's cooperativeness should
either increase or decrease the selﬁsh decision-maker's cooperation towards them, but we would need data on beliefs about in-groups and out-groups to
predict the direction of discrimination this should result in.
25 In Appendix B, section B.4, we analyse how the relative strength of discrimination in experiments featuring different identity types interacts with
the type of discrimination possible. We show discrimination is only signiﬁcantly stronger across artiﬁcial groups than across ethnic, religious or national
groups when there is no scope for statistical discrimination, while discrimination is only signiﬁcantly stronger across social/geographical groups than
across artiﬁcial groups when there is scope for statistical discrimination.
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A leading result of this paper is that discrimination in economics experiments varies by the type of identity groups are based
upon. It is very strong when groups are socially or geographically distinct, and is relatively weak when they are based on ethnicity
or nationality. Notably, it tends to be relatively strong in experiments using artiﬁcially-induced group identities – so it can con-
ﬁdently be stated that minimal groups do not produce the minimal level of discrimination. At ﬁrst glance, this seems surprising.
It might be that artiﬁcial group manipulations are stronger priming instruments than natural identity experiments tend
to use – after all, these dedicate an entire preliminary phase of the experiment to inducing feelings of identity, which will
remain at the front of subjects' minds when they are then offered the chance to discriminate. This explanation is arguably
supported by the evidence of Robbins and Krueger (2005), whose meta-analysis of psychology experiments shows subjects
exhibit stronger in-group projection – that is, they perceive in-group members to be particularly similar to them, relative to
out-group members – when identities are artiﬁcial thanwhen they are natural. On the other hand, we do not ﬁnd that team-
building exercises, which are designed speciﬁcally to strengthen artiﬁcially-induced identity and would seem to amplify
priming, have a signiﬁcant effect on the level of discrimination (this is consistent with the ﬁndings of Chen and Li (2009)).
Conversely, it could be argued that, for the populations studied in the literature, membership of particular ethnic and
national groups does not actually instil strong identity, so that even such trivial identities as can be artiﬁcially induced have a
greater effect. There is evidence that the process of globalisation has weakened national and ethnic parochialism (Buchan et
al., 2009), and in recent decades youth identity in the West and increasingly elsewhere has come to deﬁne itself to a large
extent upon individuals’ belonging to subcultures based on fashion and music tastes – preferences drawn from choice sets
which are not, indeed, so different from the apparently arbitrary minimal group painting dichotomy. However, it would seem
highly complacent to draw the conclusion from our results that racism and xenophobia are not big problems in many societies.
Another explanation may be that subjects in ethnic and national identity experiments are shying away from displaying
'politically incorrect’26 behaviour, given that racism and xenophobia are taboo in most societies today. While the link between
social acceptability and discrimination has not been well explored, the prejudice literature has yielded relevant ﬁndings: that
expressions of prejudice correlate with perceptions towards the social acceptability of such prejudice (e.g. Crandall et al.,
2002), and furthermore that this correlation is at least partly the result of norm-compliance (e.g. Blanchard et al., 1994).
It seems unlikely that discriminating on the basis of a stated preference for Klee's paintings over Kandinsky's carries any
taboo similar to ethnic or national discrimination. Indeed, some subjects may regard an artiﬁcial group situation as a game
in which they belong to one of the teams, wherein the social norm actively encourages favouritism of one’s own group – the
sheer strangeness of the setting may even lead subjects to perceive a demand for discrimination on the part of the
experimenter (see e.g. Zizzo (2010)). Concerns about social acceptability could explain also why the Soc/Geo Groupings
category produces signiﬁcantly higher discrimination than other types of natural identity. Of course, it would not be sur-
prising if relational and geographic proximity led to a stronger sense of belonging than shared ethnicity, religion or
nationality, but bear in mind too that there is arguably no taboo against favouring friends over strangers.27
If it were shown that discrimination in economics experiments is indeed limited by concerns about social acceptability, it might
cast doubt over the external applicability of such studies' ﬁndings. It is possible that if participants guess an experiment is about a
type of discrimination which is taboo, it will systematically generate a lower effect than if the subjects were unaware of its purpose.
On the other hand, the very same concerns about social acceptability might also limit certain types of discrimination outside the lab.
It is noteworthy that gender is the identity category producing the weakest discrimination: in fact, here the meta-
analysis ﬁnds a signiﬁcant amount of out-group favouritism. However, gender discrimination clearly persists in the outside
world. It may be that economics experiments do not ﬁnd it because they poorly reﬂect the conditions under which it
survives beyond the lab – in particular, in the job market.
It would be interesting to see more experiments designed to directly compare the effects of different types of group
identity. This meta-analysis includes just four. Dugar and Shahriar (2009), Li et al. (2011) and Goette et al. (2012a) all
compare discrimination between social/geographical groups and artiﬁcial groups, while Abbink and Harris (2012) use
artiﬁcial groups and political groups (which fall under the Natural Other category). The results of all four studies are con-
sistent with ours – discrimination is always lower with artiﬁcial identity. However, direct comparisons between artiﬁcial
group and ethnic or national discrimination are lacking, and it would be very illuminating to see whether such studies
support – and if so, whether they can explain – the ﬁndings of this meta-analysis.
What implications does our research have for future experiments on discrimination? First, using artiﬁcially induced
identities as a control against which to pit the results of natural identity treatments may not be recommendable, as the
artiﬁcial group manipulation appears not so much to capture the minimal level of discrimination that must result from
priming any type of identity in a laboratory as to in fact often go beyond that.
Regarding role type, we ﬁnd discrimination by third-party allocators is much stronger than by participants in any other
game setting. If social acceptability does indeed limit discrimination, this is a counterintuitive result, as the allocator role
essentially invites subjects to overtly and consciously favour one group over another and therefore seems to be the one that26 Political correctness is deﬁned as ‘The avoidance of forms of expression or action that are perceived to exclude, marginalize, or insult groups of
people who are socially disadvantaged or discriminated against’ (Oxford Dictionaries).
27 This does depend upon the context, however. There are strong taboos against nepotism in certain labour-market transactions. Possibly, the
experiments in this literature do not recreate such circumstances.
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demand effect – whereby subjects feel they are encouraged to discriminate – or even an action bias effect, if the equal split feels
like a default non-move. Another relevant factor may be that the third-party allocator is unique amongst our role types in the
decision-maker's payoff being entirely disconnected from the extent to which they discriminate. In any case, experimenters
should bear in mind that because they are more likely to identify signiﬁcant discrimination when they employ the allocator
role, they should be less conﬁdent that the same groups will discriminate against each other in different contexts.
We ﬁnd the strength of discrimination does not signiﬁcantly differ between student and non-student subject pools. This
suggests – unlike in the context of social preferences (e.g. Bellemare and Kroger, 2007; Anderson et al., 2013) – student
subjects are not a generally unrepresentative sample for questions relating to discrimination. However, we do not exclude
the possibility that they are unrepresentative in speciﬁc instances, or within particular societies.
There is scope for more experimental research investigating taste-based and statistical discrimination. We show both are
relevant, and the two types manifest themselves to different extents in different contexts. However, relatively few
experiments have been designed to distinguish between taste-based and statistical discrimination, and more could be
known about the mechanisms underlying them.
As a ﬁnal observation, there is a great deal of variation in the ﬁndings of the experimental economics discrimination
literature. Our analysis can explain some of it, but our LPM regressions typically have R2 statistics below 0.2, and the meta-
regressions' Adjusted R2s are rarely above 0.35. As might be expected, discrimination does seem to vary idiosyncratically and
is not easy to predict. The results of natural identity experiments do not seem very generalizable – they probably reﬂect
more the characteristics of the speciﬁc groups under investigation, and the relationships between them, than aspects of the
experimental design. Whilst a drawback for some research questions, this also means there is a great deal of scope for future
experimental studies aimed at measuring the levels of discrimination within subject pools of speciﬁc interest. Furthermore,
given the potential concerns we raise about experimenter demand effects and the external validity of lab experiments on
discrimination, the important role of ﬁeld experiments should be emphasised. Subjects in such studies are unaware they are
being observed by experimenters and their behaviour can therefore not be inﬂuenced by the fact. Field experiments can test
the generalisability of lab ﬁndings on discrimination.Acknowledgements
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See Table A1–A3.Table A.1
Subjective decisions on appropriately deﬁned groups.
Study Notes
Burns (2004) We consider ‘coloured’ to be an appropriate ethnic group in South Africa (as deﬁned in comparison to ‘white’
and ‘black’).
Chen et al. (2014) We do not consider ‘Asian’ to be an appropriate ethnic group in the USA.
Ferraro and Cummings (2007) We consider ‘Hispanic’ to be an appropriate ethnic group in the USA. (Justiﬁcation, relative to ‘Asian’: Hispanic
people in the USA share a more uniﬁed culture than those of Asian descent; they are descended from more
linguistically homogeneous peoples than Asians)
Friesen et al. (2012) We do not consider ‘East Asian’ and ‘South Asian’ to be appropriate ethnic groups in Canada.
Table A.2
Game types in meta-analysis and how they measure discrimination.
Role Type How discrimination is measured Type of discrimination possible
Trust Game Returner Difference in proportion of amount received from
the sender that is returned*, between in-group
and out-group matching.
Taste-based only
*NB: Ploner and Soraperra (2004) use Indirect
Trust Game, where the amount returned is not
given to the sender but a group member of
theirs
Agent in Principal-Agent Game Difference in amount sent to principal, between
in-group and out-group matching.
Taste-based only
(Masella et al., 2012)
Dictator; Proposer in Unilateral Power Game
(Zizzo, 2011)
Difference in amount sent to recipient, between
in-group and out-group matching. (NB: Büchner
and Dittrich (2002) use a saving game where one
player leaves the game early and decides how
much to leave their partner. This decision is the
equivalent of that faced by a dictator)
Taste-based only
Allocator Difference in amount allocated to in-group and
out-group member.
Taste-based only
Responder in Ultimatum Game, Hold-up
Game (Morita and Servátka, 2013)
Difference in likelihood of rejecting an offer,
controlling for its size, between in-group and out-
group matching.
Taste-based only
Responder in Proposer-Responder Game
(McLeish and Oxoby, 2007)
Difference in amount by which proposer’s payoff
is reduced, controlling for amount offered by
proposer, between in-group and out-group
matching.
Taste-based only
Responder in Proposer-Responder Game
(Chen and Li, 2009; Currarini and Mengel,
2012)
Difference in rate of choosing more other-
regarding response, between in-group and out-
group matching.
Taste-based only
Third-party punisher Difference in punishment level, controlling for
behaviour of punishee, between in-group and
out-group matching.
Taste-based only
One-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Difference in rate of cooperation, between in-
group and out-group matching.
Taste-based only
Trader in market games For bidders: difference in price offered, between
in-group and out-group matching. For sellers:
difference in price accepted, between in-group
and out-group matching.
Taste-based only for sellers in one-shot inter-
actions; taste-based and statistical for bidders in
one-shot interactions, and for all players in
repeated games.
Public Goods Game Difference in contribution level, between in-group
and out-group matching.
Taste-based only in one-shot games (Hopfensitz,
2013); taste-based and statistical in repeated
games.
Partner-Choosing Role Difference in rate of choosing in-group partner
and out-group partner.
Taste-based only if chosen partner does not
become active decision-maker in subsequent
games; taste-based and statistical if they do.
Repeated Common Pool Withdrawal Game Difference in withdrawal level, between in-group
and out-group matching.
Taste-based and statistical.
Carpenter and Cardenas, (2011)
Minimal Effort Game (Chen and Chen, 2011) Difference in effort level, between in-group and
out-group matching.
Taste-based and statistical.
Trust Game Sender; Principal in Principal-
Agent Game (Masella et al., 2012); First
Mover in Hold-up Game (Morita and Ser-
vatka, 2013)
With continuous action space: difference in
amount sent, between in-group and out-group
matching. With binary action space: difference in
rate of choosing to trust, between in-group and
out-group matching.
Taste-based and statistical.
Investor in Investment Game (Wu, 2009) Difference in amount invested in manager’s pro-
ject, between in-group and out-group matching.
Taste-based and statistical.
Ultimatum Game Proposer; Second Mover in
Hold-up Game (Morita and Servatka, 2013);
First Mover in Proposer-Responder Game
(McLeish and Oxoby, 2007)
Difference in amount offered, between in-group
and out-group matching.
Taste-based and statistical.
Proposer in Proposer-Responder Game (Chen
and Li, 2009; Currarini and Mengel, 2012)
Difference in rate of choosing more other-
regarding ﬁrst move, between in-group and out-
group matching.
Taste-based and statistical.
Nash Demand Game (Rufﬂe and Sosis, 2006;
Zizzo, 2011)
Difference in amount claimed, between in-group
and out-group matching
Taste-based and statistical.
Stag Hunt Difference in rate of choosing hawkish strategy,
between in-group and out-group matching.
Taste-based and statistical.
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Table A.3
List of signiﬁcant results from studies designed to distinguish between taste-based and statistical discrimination
Result Paper Role Groups
Taste-based and statistical
discrimination
Banuri et al. (2012) Partner-choosing role Colleges within university (Free Nepotism
treatment)
Bernhard et al. (2006) Dictator Tribes
Binzel and Fehr (2013) Trust Game Sender Social groups
Currarini and Mengel
(2012)
Partner-choosing role Artiﬁcial (comparison of COORD, ENDO and
LOWB treatments)
Etang et al. (2011a) Trust Game Sender Villages
Taste-based discrimination only Burns (2004) Trust Game Sender Ethnic (coloured in-group, black out-group)
Trust Game Sender Ethnic (coloured in-group, white out-group)
Chuah et al. (2013) Trust Game Sender Religious (Hindu in-group, Muslim out-group)
Trust Game Sender Religious (Muslim in-group, Hindu out-group)
Ferraro and Cummings
(2007)
Ultimatum Game Proposer Ethnic (Hispanic in-group, Navajo out-group)
Guillen and Ji (2011) Trust Game Sender National (Australian in-group, non-Australian
out-group)
Kim et al. (2013) Trust Game Sender National (North Korean in-group, South Korean
out-group – sample 1)
Trust Game Sender National (North Korean in-group, South Korean
out-group – sample 2)
McLeish and Oxoby
(2007)
First Mover in Proposer-
Responder Game
Artiﬁcial (OP treatment)
First Mover in Proposer-
Responder Game
Artiﬁcial (NO treatment)
Rufﬂe and Sosis (2006) Nash Demand Game Social/geographical (Kibbutz in-group, city out-
group)
Statistical discrimination only Banuri et al. (2012) Partner-choosing role Colleges within university (Costly Nepotism
treatment)
Boarini et al. (2009) Ultimatum Game Proposer National (French in-group, Indian out-group)
Chen and Chen (2011) Minimal Effort Game Artiﬁcial (Enhanced treatment)
Haile et al. (2008) Trust Game Sender Ethnic (white in-group, black out-group)
Masella et al. (2014) Principal in Principal-Agent
Game
Artiﬁcial
Taste-based out-group favouritism
only
Burns (2004) Trust Game Sender Ethnic (white in-group, black out-group)
Trust Game Sender Ethnic (black in-group, white out-group)
Trust Game Sender Ethnic (black in-group, coloured out-group)
Hennig-Schmidt et. al.
(2007)
Trust Game Sender National (Israeli in-group, Palestinian out-group)
Trust Game Sender National (Palestinian in-group, Israeli out-group)
Kim et al. (2013) Trust Game Sender National (South Korean in-group, North Korean
out-group – sample 1)
Trust Game Sender National (South Korean in-group, North Korean
out-group – sample 2)
Slonim and Guillen (2010) Trust Game Sender Gender (male in-group, Gender/Ability Selection
treatment)
Trust Game Sender Gender (male in-group, No Selection treatment)
Partner-choosing role Gender (male in-group, Trust Game treatment)
Statistical out-group favouritism
only
Boarini et al. (2009) Ultimatum Game Proposer National (Indian in-group, French out-group)
Hennig-Schmidt et al.
(2007)
Trust Game Sender National (German in-group, Palestinian out-
group)
Slonim and Guillen (2010) Partner-choosing role Gender (female in-group, Trust Game treatment)
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B.1 Further analysis of role types
In this section we investigate the effects on discrimination of using speciﬁc game types. We recode the role type vari-
ables, assigning dummies to speciﬁc game settings in the following way. Trust games and similar principal-agent games
provide two roles: senders (TG Sender, 98 observations) and returners (TG Returner, 81). The next most common role type is
the Dictator (68). Prisoner's dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool withdrawal games are all social dilemmas,
and are coded under a single category (Social Dilemma, 58). Next we have third-party allocators (Allocator, 33). Ultimatum
games and similar bargaining settings are grouped together and split into two role types: ﬁrst movers (Proposer, 31) and
T. Lane / European Economic Review 90 (2016) 375–402 391second movers (Responder, 27). Treating Dictator as the omitted category in our regressions, we form a set of binary
independent variables from the other six role types, plus the additional variable Game Other (45 observations) into which
are placed the remaining game settings that we did not think could be adequately categorised.28
Table C.3a in Appendix C displays the output of regressions incorporating these variables. These regressions are the
equivalent of those presented in Table 2, the only change being the recoding of the role type variables. As above, LPMa1 and
Metareg1 show discrimination to be signiﬁcantly stronger when the decision-maker is a third-party allocator than when he
or she is a dictator (the omitted category). Linear restriction tests (Table C.3b) also show the third-party allocator role is
more likely to be associated with discrimination than all the other role types, with the difference always signiﬁcant at the 1%
level under both models. Again, the other role types do not consistently carry signiﬁcantly different effects from one
another. This is at odds with the analysis of Balliet et al. (2014), who ﬁnd discrimination is stronger by trust game senders
than by dictators, and stronger still in social dilemmas. With out-group favouritism as the dependent variable (LPMa2), the
only signiﬁcant differences between role types are that proposers are less likely to engage in out-group favouritism than
dictators, trust game senders, trust game returners and subjects in the Game Other category.
Result A1. : We do not ﬁnd strong effects associated with such speciﬁc role types as the trust game sender or returner,
players in social dilemmas, or bargaining game proposers or responders.
B.2 Does the strength of discrimination in artiﬁcial group experiments depend on the method used to induce identity?
The way in which identity is artiﬁcially instilled in subjects varies from experiment to experiment. However, we can
identity two broad categories of artiﬁcial group creation. One follows the original Tajfel et al. (1971) process of allowing
subjects to self-select into groups. Typically this involves asking participants to choose a preference between the art of
Klee and Kandinsky, although some studies elicit preferences on other choice sets, such as favourite colours. We code
these observations under Preferences. The other main category gives subjects no control over which group they belong to.
In such cases they are simply randomly assigned and labelled as belonging to, for instance, the ‘red’ or ‘blue’ group. We
code these manipulations as Labelling. Occasionally, a different type of identity inducement is done – for example, groups
can be based on subjects’ tendency to overestimate or underestimate the number of dots on a screen (Guala et al., 2013;
Ioannou et al., 2013), or by the time at which they undertake a particular task (Ahmed, 2007). These cases we code as
Other Method.
Another way artiﬁcial group manipulations vary is by whether they contain additional stages in which group
members interact, between being placed into groups and before the task upon which discrimination is measured. These
stages often involve games in which group members must work together to earn monetary rewards, although on some
occasions they merely interact non-strategically as a result of being permitted to converse electronically. Such stages are
introduced as a mechanism to strengthen artiﬁcial group identities. We code their presence in studies under Team
Building.
In order to test how these different procedures affect the extent of discrimination, we run LPM and meta-regressions on
our sub-sample of observations for which identity is artiﬁcial. These are presented in Appendix C, Table C.4. We ﬁnd there is
no signiﬁcant difference between whether groups are self-selected or randomly selected. Also, while the coefﬁcients are in
the direction of strengthening discrimination, we ﬁnd the effect of team-building exercises not to be signiﬁcant. From these
results, we infer that the precise form of identity inducement is not crucial to the outcome of artiﬁcial group experiments.
This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Chen and Li (2009), whose experiment addresses these questions.
Result A2. : The strength of discrimination in artiﬁcial group experiments does not depend signiﬁcantly on the method
used to induce identity.
B.3 Can country-level variables explain discrimination?
Our meta-analysis encompasses geographical diversity, with data from 31 countries. Including cases where the out-
group was located in a different country, 169 results from 34 studies come from Europe, 116 observations from 22 studies are
from North America, 85 results from 17 studies are from Asia, 37 observations from seven studies come from Africa, nine
results from three studies come from Latin America, and ten observations from three studies are from Australasia. Ten
results from two papers have decision-makers located in more than one country, while one paper does not mention where
its experiment took place. The country providing the most observations is the USA, with 106 from 19 studies.28 Speciﬁcally, the Game Other category consists of players in the following settings: unstructured bargaining games; the battle of the sexes; coor-
dination games; indirect trust games; market-trading games; minimal effort games; Nash Demand games; partner-choosing situations; saving games; stag
hunts; and third-party punishment games. Several of these could have been coded under a standalone category – coordination games and variants – but
there would only be eight observations in such a category.
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the country in which an experiment is run. In Appendix C, Table C.5, therefore, we report regressions including location
dummies for the USA and Europe, and country-level measures of Individualism (from the Hofstede Centre), ethno-linguistic-
religious Fractionalisation (constructed from Alesina et al. (2003), by averaging each country’s scores for ethnic, linguistic
and religious fractionalization29) and prosperity (Log GDPpc, the log of per capita national income at purchasing power
parity, as estimated by the World Bank). Using these independent variables requires trimming the sample to exclude
experiments conducted across countries, as well as those in locations for which data on Individualism is not available.
We do not ﬁnd any country-level variables to be signiﬁcant, with rare exceptions. In LPMa2, we ﬁnd the probability of
observing out-group favouritism is lower in the USA than in the rest of the world, signiﬁcant at the 5% level. However, once
controlling for country-level individualism, as in LPMa3, the effect disappears. Individualism itself only has a weakly sig-
niﬁcant effect of reducing the likelihood of out-group favouritism, after omitting the USA dummy in LPMa4.
While the insigniﬁcance of country-level variables in our analysis appears to show that results on discrimination can be
generalised across cultures, we do not argue this is necessarily the case. The locations at which experiments on dis-
crimination have been conducted are not a random global sample; in many cases they are handpicked by researchers who
have prior reason to believe they have an interesting discrimination-related question to ask of a particular subject pool.
Result A3. : Country-level variables are not found to signiﬁcantly explain discrimination.
B.4 How does the experimental context affect the prevalence of each type of discrimination?
To investigate the strength of different types of discrimination in experiments with different types of identity, we run
LPM and meta-regressions on the sub-sample of observations for which there is scope only for taste-based discrimination,
and the sub-sample for which there is scope for both taste-based and statistical discrimination. The results are presented in
Appendix C, Table C.6a; LPMa1 and Metareg1 relate to the taste-based only sub-sample, while LPMa2 and Metareg2 relate to
the both-types sub-sample. The table reports whether the coefﬁcients for each identity category signiﬁcantly differ between
models 1 and 2; this is deduced by running pooled models with interaction terms. The results of linear restriction tests are
also presented in Appendix C, Table C.6b.
When it can only be driven by taste, according to both the LPM and the meta-regression discrimination is signiﬁcantly
greater across artiﬁcial groups than across ethnicities, religions, nationalities or gender. All of these differences are sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level, apart from the difference between Artiﬁcial and Religion in Metareg(1), which is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. However, when discrimination can be driven both by tastes and statistical beliefs, neither model ﬁnds it to sig-
niﬁcantly differ between artiﬁcial group experiments and those on nationality, religion or ethnicity.30
With only taste-based discrimination possible, discrimination is not signiﬁcantly different across artiﬁcial groups to
across socially or geographically distinct groups. However, when there is also scope for statistical discrimination, dis-
crimination is signiﬁcantly higher (1% level) among socially or geographically distinct groups.
The only identity category whose coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly differs between the sample where only taste-based dis-
crimination is possible and the sample where both types of discrimination are possible, in models ran on both dependent
variables, is Soc/Geo Groupings. The coefﬁcients on Ethnicity, Religion and Nationality do not signiﬁcantly differ between
samples. The test on the omitted category, Artiﬁcial, shows its coefﬁcient also does not signiﬁcantly differ between samples.
We therefore interpret the narrowing of the discrimination gap between Artiﬁcial and Ethnicity, Religion and Nationality
when scope is added for statistical discrimination as being driven by beliefs either reducing discrimination in artiﬁcial
identity experiments, or enhancing it in experiments with ethnicity, religion and nationality, or both. We interpret the
widening of the discrimination gap between Artiﬁcial and Soc/Geo Groupings when scope is added for statistical dis-
crimination as being driven primarily by beliefs enhancing discrimination between social and geographical groups.
Result A4. : Discrimination is only signiﬁcantly stronger between artiﬁcial groups compared to between ethnic, religious
and national groups when there is scope only for taste-based discrimination. Discrimination is only signiﬁcantly stronger
between social/geographical groups compared to between artiﬁcial groups when there is scope for both types of
discrimination.Appendix C. : Additional regression output
See Tables C.1,C.2, C.3a,C.3b,C.4,C.5,C.6a,C.6b.29 We also ran regressions containing separate variables for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization, none of which were found to have
signiﬁcance.
30 Except with Ethnicity at the 10% level in the LPM.
Table C.1
Linear probability regressions on out-group favouritism.
Dependent variable Out-group favouritism
LPMa1 LPMa2
Type of discrimination possible
TasteþStatistical 0.003
(0.020)
Role Types
First Mover 0.031
(0.029)
Second Mover 0.012
(0.027)
Simultaneous Mover 0.025
(0.038)
Allocator 0.049
(0.037)
Partner Chooser 0.031
(0.063)
Identity
Ethnicity 0.041 0.035
(0.040) (0.036)
Religion 0.004 0.008
(0.052) (0.050)
Nationality 0.118n 0.111
(0.069) (0.068)
Gender 0.222nnn 0.231nnn
(0.046) (0.047)
Soc/Geo Groupings 0.051nn 0.045n
(0.024) (0.023)
Natural Other 0.025 0.041
(0.034) (0.026)
Controls
Students 0.023 0.026
(0.041) (0.038)
Sample Size 4.9e4 2.0e4
(7.2e4) (2.9e4)
Constant 0.051 0.038
(0.046) (0.047)
R2 0.088 0.084
N 441 441
Notes: LPMa1 and LPMa2 are linear probability models run on full sample; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Artiﬁcial (identity); errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 77 clusters; standard errors in italics.
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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Table C.2
Logistic regressions on discrimination and out-group favouritism.
Dependent variable Discrimination Out-group favouritism
LOGITa1 LOGITa2
Identity
Ethnicity 0.260nnn 0.062
(0.046) (0.069)
Religion 0.195nn 0.003
(0.098) (0.061)
Nationality 0.216nnn 0.172n
(0.065) (0.095)
Gender 0.252nnn 0.326nnn
(0.045) (0.097)
Soc/Geo Groupings 0.244nn (dropped)
(0.111)
Natural Other 0.056 (dropped)
(0.138)
Role Types
First Mover 0.031 0.022
(0.081) (0.017)
Second Mover 0.080 0.007
(0.066) (0.017)
Simultaneous Mover 0.025 0.011
(0.113) (0.030)
Allocator 0.413nnn 0.035nn
(0.103) (0.014)
Partner Chooser 0.075 0.035
(0.125) (0.045)
Controls
Students 0.011 0.037
(0.072) (0.053)
Sample Size 1.7e4 1.9e4
(4.9e4) (1.8e4)
Pseudo R2 0.167 0.132
N 441 367
Notes: LPMa1 and LPMa2 are linear probability models run on full sample; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Artiﬁcial (identity); errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 77 clusters in LOGITa1 and 66 in LOGITa2; standard errors in parentheses; for dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete
change from 0 to 1.
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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Table C.3a
Linear probability regression on discrimination and meta-regression on effect size (further analysis of role type).
Dependent variable Discrimination d Out-group favouritism
LPMa1 LPMb1 Metareg1 LPMa2
Identity
Ethnicity 0.287nnn 0.282nnn 0.113 0.032
(0.078) (0.084) (0.081) (0.041)
Religion 0.219 0.220 0.092 0.027
(0.141) (0.156) (0.128) (0.057)
Nationality 0.234nnn 0.133 0.112 0.107
(0.085) (0.106) (0.078) (0.067)
Gender 0.314nnn 0.339nnn 0.500nnn 0.233nnn
(0.065) (0.069) (0.098) (0.042)
Soc/Geo Groupings 0.242nn 0.242n 0.365nnn 0.057nn
(0.102) (0.124) (0.091) (0.023)
Natural Other 0.069 0.286 0.203 0.034
(0.176) (0.179) (0.193) (0.035)
Role Types
TG Sender 0.045 0.045 0.002 2.6e4
(0.126) (0.086) (0.081) (0.027)
TG Returner 0.126n 0.147n 0.112 0.016
(0.074) (0.083) (0.087) (0.024)
Social Dilemma 0.014 0.010 0.022 0.011
(0.106) (0.115) (0.097) (0.039)
Allocator 0.348nnn 0.400nnn 0.991nnn 0.042
(0.104) (0.141) (0.154) (0.034)
Proposer 0.081 0.131 0.012 0.088nn
(0.101) (0.090) (0.106) (0.041)
Responder 0.029 0.129 0.120 0.017
(0.099) (0.109) (0.135) (0.055)
Game Other 0.045 0.087 0.034 0.004
(0.098) (0.119) (0.104) (0.037)
Controls
Students 0.004 0.028 0.103 0.018
(0.068) (0.077) (0.077) (0.040)
Sample Size 1.2e4 5.7e5 7.1e4n 2.7e4
(4.3e4) (4.7e3) (4.3e3) (3.2e3)
Constant 0.416nnn 0.442nnn 0.236nn 0.037
(0.087) (0.100) (0.106) (0.048)
R2 (adjusted in Metareg1) 0.206 0.214 0.237 0.094
N 441 364 364 441
Notes:LPMa1 and LPMa2 are linear probability models run on full sample, Metareg1 is meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available,
LPMb1 is linear probability model run on same sample as Metareg1; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Artiﬁcial (identity); errors in LPM
models are corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 77 clusters in LPMa1 and LPMa2, and 67 in LPMb1; standard errors in italics.
nnn po0.01.
nn po0.05.
n po0.1.
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Table C.3b
Linear Restriction Tests on models presented in Table C.3a.
Null Hypothesis P value on two-tailed test
LPMa1 LPMb1 Metareg1 LPMa2
Identity
Ethnicity¼Religion 0.613 0.652 0.872 0.43
Ethnicity¼Nationality 0.553 0.157 0.991 0.256
Ethnicity¼Gender 0.705 0.452 0.001nnn o0.001nnn
Ethnicity¼Soc/GeoGroupings o0.001nnn o0.001nnn o0.001nnn 0.066n
Ethnicity¼Natural Other 0.203 0.983 0.642 0.164
Religion¼Nationality 0.909 0.571 0.884 0.126
Religion¼Gender 0.496 0.431 0.009nnn o0.001nnn
Religion¼Soc/Geo Groupings 0.001nnn 0.002nnn o0.001nnn 0.544
Religion¼Natural Other 0.47 0.735 0.586 0.902
Nationality¼Gender 0.286 0.017nn 0.001nnn 0.085n
Nationality¼Soc/Geo Groupings o0.001nnn 0.007nnn o0.001nnn 0.017nn
Nationality¼Natural Other 0.374 0.424 0.653 0.017nn
Gender¼Soc/Geo Groupings o0.001nnn o0.001nnn o0.001nnn o0.001nnn
Gender¼Natural Other 0.169 0.769 0.16 o0.001nnn
Soc/Geo Groupings¼Natural Other 0.092n 0.004nnn 0.003nnn 0.452
Role Types
TG Sender¼TG Returner 0.25 0.171 0.119 0.53
TG Sender¼Social Dilemma 0.605 0.648 0.782 0.808
TG Sender¼Allocator o0.001nnn 0.008nnn o0.001nnn 0.2
TG Sender¼Proposer 0.709 0.343 0.887 0.030nn
TG Sender¼Responder 0.891 0.25 0.37 0.758
TG Sender¼Game Other 0.381 0.282 0.748 0.907
TG Returner¼Social Dilemma 0.206 0.176 0.31 0.526
TG Returner¼Allocator o0.001nnn 0.001nnn o0.001nnn 0.138
TG Returner¼Proposer 0.647 0.863 0.341 0.016nn
TG Returner¼Responder 0.414 0.061n 0.085n 0.551
TG Returner¼Game Other 0.086n 0.050n 0.155 0.758
Social Dilemma¼Allocator 0.014nnn 0.019nn o0.001nnn 0.398
Social Dilemma¼Proposer 0.415 0.213 0.932 0.058n
Social Dilemma¼Responder 0.761 0.458 0.309 0.912
Social Dilemma¼Game Other 0.788 0.564 0.616 0.726
Allocator¼Proposer o0.001nnn o0.001nnn o0.001nnn 0.158
Allocator¼Responder 0.005nnn 0.107 o0.001nnn 0.626
Allocator¼Game Other 0.018nn 0.050nn o0.001nnn 0.234
Proposer¼Responder 0.722 0.093n 0.367 0.183
Proposer¼Game Other 0.186 0.021nn 0.699 0.034nn
Responder¼Game Other 0.542 0.806 0.554 0.699
Note: LPMa is linear probability model run on full sample, Metareg is meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available, LPMb is linear
probability model run on same sample as Metareg.
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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Table C.4
Linear probability regressions on discrimination and meta-regressions on effect size for artiﬁcial identity experiments only.
Dependent variable Discrimination d
LPM Metareg
Role Types
First Mover 0.190 0.074
(0.165) (0.127)
Second Mover 0.102 0.098
(0.142) (0.135)
Simultaneous Mover 0.211 0.005
(0.154) (0.139)
Allocator 0.236n 0.898nnn
(0.130) (0.170)
Partner Chooser 0.061 0.083
(0.213) (0.182)
Controls
Students 0.032 0.128
(0.123) (0.207)
Sample Size 0.002nnn 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Identity Inducement Method
Labelling 0.117 0.030
(0.081) (0.085)
Other Method 0.140 0.102
(0.125) (0.141)
Team Building 0.085 0.031
(0.095) (0.691)
Constant 0.409n 0.102
(0.207) (0.247)
R2 (adjusted for Metareg) 0.154 0.262
N 169 146
Notes: LPM is linear probability model run on artiﬁcial identity sample, Metareg is meta-regression run on artiﬁcial identity sample for which effect sizes
are available; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Preferences (Identity inducement method); errors in LPM are corrected for heteroskedasticity,
with 32 clusters; standard errors in parentheses.
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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Table C.5
Linear probability regressions on discrimination and out-group favouritism, and meta-regression on effect size, with country-level variables included.
Dependent variable Discrimination d Out-group favouritism
LPMa1 Metareg1 LPMa2 LPMa3 LPMa4
Identity
Ethnicity 0.220nn 0.171 0.053 0.044 0.042
(0.086) (0.104) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042)
Religion 0.146 0.198 0.014 0.063 0.069
(0.192) (0.179) (0.040) (0.090) (0.079)
Gender 0.294nnn 0.386nnn 0.254nnn 0.244nnn 0.239nnn
(0.100) (0.113) (0.047) (0.048) (0.045)
Soc/Geo Groupings 0.260nn 0.273nnn 0.029n 0.052n 0.055nn
(0.103) (0.095) (0.016) (0.029) (0.025)
Natural Other 0.008 0.311 0.023 0.093 0.099n
(0.177) (0.213) (0.017) (0.068) (0.057)
Role Types
First Mover 0.027 0.245nnn 0.013 0.012 0.012
(0.101) (0.088) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Second Mover 0.086 0.182n 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.080) (0.094) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Simultaneous 0.080 0.206n 0.004 0.004 0.006
(0.108) (0.110) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Allocator 0.423nnn 1.178nnn 0.026 0.046 0.049n
(0.142) (0.165) (0.020) (0.029) (0.027)
Partner Chooser 0.058 0.208 0.049 0.067 –0.066
(0.130) (0.141) (0.060) (0.063) (0.063)
Controls
Fractionalisation 0.015 0.414
(0.265) (0.257)
LogGDPpc 0.020 0.031
(0.083) (0.089)
Europe 0.100 0.277n
(0.131) (0.150)
USA 0.038 0.096 0.049nn 0.012
(0.132) (0.163) (0.022) (0.034)
Individualism 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002n
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.191 0.174 0.035n 0.167 0.179n
(0.731) (0.813) (0.021) (0.119) (0.094)
R2 (adjusted in Metareg1) 0.217 0.256 0.112 0.122 0.122
N 345 304 359 345 345
Notes: LPMa1, LPMa3 and LPMa4 are linear probability models run on full sample excluding experiments conducted across countries and in countries for
which data on Individualism is not available, LPMa2 is linear probability model run on full sample excluding experiments conducted across countries,
Metareg1 is meta-regression run on sample for which effect sizes are available excluding experiments conducted across countries and in countries for
which data on Individualism is not available; omitted categories are Dictator (role type) and Artiﬁcial (identity); errors in LPM models are corrected for
heteroskedasticity, with 60 clusters in LPMa1, LPMa3 and LPMa4, and 65 in LPMa2; standard errors in parentheses.
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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Table C.6a
Linear probability regressions on discrimination and meta-regressions on effect size, with scope only for taste-based discrimination (Model 1) and scope
for both types of discrimination (Model 2).
Dependent variable Discrimination d
Taste-based
only
TasteþStatistical Test of coefﬁcient
difference
Taste-based
only
TasteþStatistical Test of coefﬁcient
difference
LPMa1 LPMa2 Metareg1 Metareg2
Identity
Ethnicity 0.351nnn 0.195n 0.291nnn 0.020
(0.078) (0.100) (0.088) (0.169)
Religion 0.474nnn 0.159 0.443nn 0.048
(0.125) (0.234) (0.172) (0.206)
Nationality 0.292nnn 0.162 0.312nnn -0.133
(0.089) (0.122) (0.115) (0.113)
Gender 0.290nnn 0.352nnn 0.474nnn 0.642nnn
(0.090) (0.080) (0.122) (0.167)
Soc/Geo Groupings 0.081 0.408nnn nn 0.015 0.532nnn nnn
(0.159) (0.126) (0.125) (0.142)
Natural Other 0.146 0.224 0.301 0.227
(0.263) (0.262) (0.329) (0.281)
Controls
Students 0.041 0.047 0.034 0.178
(0.101) (0.095) (0.101) (0.142)
Sample Size 6.6e4 4.9e4 1.7e5 3.1e4
(4.8e4) (7.2e4) (5.4e4) (7.2e4)
Constant 0.380nnn 0.383nnn 0.355nnn 0.178
(0.117) (0.120) (0.114) (0.153)
R2 (adjusted in
Metaregs)
0.175 0.196 0.117 0.174
N 262 179 204 160
Notes: LPMa1 is linear probability model run on the sample for which discrimination can only be taste-based, LPMa2 is linear probability model run on the
sample for which dicrimination can be both taste-based and statistical, Metareg1 is meta-regression run on the sample for which discrimination can only
be taste-based and effect sizes are available, Metareg2 is meta-regression run on the sample for which discrimination can be both taste-based and
statistical and effect sizes are available; 'test of coefﬁcient difference' reports whether coefﬁcients differ signiﬁcantly between models 1 and 2; the omitted
category is Artiﬁcial (identity); errors in LPM models are corrected for heteroskedasticity, with 65 clusters in LPMa1 and 59 in LPMa2; standard errors in
parentheses.
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
Table C.6b
Linear Restriction Tests on models presented in Table C.6a.
Null Hypothesis P value on two-tailed test
LPMa1 LPMa2 Metareg1 Metareg2
Ethnicity¼Religion 0.171 0.876 0.38 0.756
Ethnicity¼Nationality 0.353 0.788 0.87 0.405
Ethnicity¼Gender 0.348 0.045nn 0.163 0.003nnn
Ethnicity¼Soc/Geo Groupings 0.002nnn o0.001nnn 0.016nn 0.005nnn
Ethnicity¼Natural Other 0.052n 0.911 0.977 0.373
Religion¼Nationality 0.082n 0.989 0.509 0.699
Religion¼Gender 0.097n 0.413 0.878 0.020nn
Religion¼Soc/Geo Groupings o0.001nnn 0.013nn o0.005nnn 0.006nnn
Religion¼Natural Other 0.018nn 0.839 0.679 0.532
Nationality¼Gender 0.985 0.057n 0.29 0.005nnn
Nationality¼Soc/Geo Groupings 0.012nn o0.001nnn 0.04nn o0.001nnn
Nationality¼Natural Other 0.099n 0.823 0.974 0.745
Gender¼Soc/Geo Groupings 0.015nn o0.001nnn 0.003nnn o0.001nnn
Gender¼Natural Other 0.097n 0.624 0.613 0.192
Soc/Geo Groupings¼Natural Other 0.81 0.015nn 0.33 0.007
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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